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Abstract
Employee stock options represent a significant potential source of dilution for many
shareholders. It is well known that reported earnings tend to understate the associated
costs, but an efficient stock market will show no such bias. If by contrast stock prices
underestimate the future costs implied by stock option grants, option exercises will
produce negative abnormal returns. We design and implement a stock-picking rule based
on predictions of stock-option exercise using widely available data. The rule identifies
stocks that subsequently suffer significant negative abnormal returns using either a
CAPM or the three factor Fama-French benchmarks. According to our point estimates, if
the cost of employee stock options as a fraction of market capitalization is 10%, the stock
will subsequently exhibit a negative abnormal return of between 3% and 5%. There is
some evidence of market learning in that the abnormal returns tend to fall over time. We
use a restricted sample of actual stock exercises and find that the reduced power of our
trading rule does not reflect a reduced ability to predict stock option exercise. It also
does not seem to reflect improved accounting disclosure since the portion of option costs
recognized in diluted earnings per share appears to be priced by the market in all our
sample years.
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There has been a wide and heated debate about how exactly to value and report the costs
of employee stock options. A key issue that has not been directly addressed is whether
the stock market already takes account of such costs. Stock option grants do not result in
any direct charge to earnings, but the economic costs often exceed earnings for high-tech
firms.
1 To take an “old economy” example, in 1996 Pepsi granted stock options to its
employees with a Black-Scholes value of over $500 million, equal to almost one-third of
its earnings for the year. If this value were subtracted from earnings, Pepsi’s price-
earnings ratio for 1996 would increase from just under 34 to over 50.
Of course, this does not establish that Pepsi was overvalued. Sufficient growth prospects
would warrant the higher multiple, and the motivational properties of the options could
contribute to such growth. Moreover, employees usually exercise their options before
their maturity date, thereby forfeiting some of the Black-Scholes value and reducing the
cost to shareholders (eg., Huddart and Lang, 1996). Core, Guay and Kothari (2000) and
Huson, Scott and Wier (1998) find evidence consistent with efficient pricing of stock
option costs in that that market value is lower for firms with more potential stock option
costs. These studies are reassuring but are only able to use current earnings and book
value to control for all the relevant underlying determinants of firm value.
We use a trading rule to test whether the market appropriately values stock option
liabilities, using publicly available data. If the market efficiently prices option
obligations, we will not be able to earn abnormal returns based on this information. Our
trading rule first makes the obvious assumption that investors effectively disregard at
least a portion of the costs of stock option grants. In order to implement the rule, we
make the additional assumption that prices do not reflect option costs until they
materialize upon exercise by employees.
2 Our test does not rule out a “temporary”
inefficiency in which the market adjusts with a lag but before the options vest and are
exercised. Without a theory of such lags, searching for such an effect would inevitably
1 The Economist (2000) reports that the Black-Scholes value of such grants in 1999 was just over 6% of
the earnings of an average S&P 500 firm, and for high-tech firms, the values often exceed earnings. Core
and Guay (2000) document that the Black-Scholes value of employee stock options average almost 4% of
the market capitalization of the average large corporation and the value can be as high as 24%. The
Investor Responsibility Research Center (2001) reports similar figures.
2 Not surprisingly, this idea has been expressed by others. One of the authors spoke in June 2000 to a
reporter for the Surrey Times in British Columbia, Canada who complained that a high-tech stock he had
invested in never went above $100. His view was that whenever the stock went near that level, employees
of the company would exercise a set of options and drive the price back down. As far as we are aware, he
has not exploited this predictable market movement.2
result in data-snooping; in hindsight there will always be some period in which option-
granting firms have lower than expected returns.
A benefit of the trading rule approach is that it forces the researcher to recognize many of
the constraints that an active investor would bear in order to exploit potential mispricing.
Most importantly, we cannot use data on actual employee exercises, as in Carpenter and
Remmers (2000) and Vargus (1998). This research can ascertain whether executives
made well-timed trades based on their own information, but is mute on the question of
market efficiency unless the market is sluggish in its reaction to the revelation of an
insider sale (see Seyhun, 1998). By contrast, we use public information to forecast future
exercises and form our portfolios in anticipation of such exercises. Finally, we predict
only the year in which an exercise will take place and use data at the beginning of the
year to estimate the costs of such exercises. While this exposes our strategy to significant
risk, it keeps transaction costs to a minimum.
Despite the above hurdles, our trading rule seems to produce abnormal performance. We
use ExecuComp data on approximately 1000 stocks starting in the earliest available year
(1992) to form a trading rule for each of the years 1996-99. The reason we have such a
restricted time-series is that most employee options are not fully exercisable for four
years. Despite this limitation, we estimate a reliable and negative relationship between
abnormal returns and our measure of the unrecognized cost of employee stock options.
In a regression that includes all four years of data, the relationship is significant at the 1%
level for raw returns and for abnormal returns based on either a CAPM or a three-factor
Fama-French (1993) benchmark. Moreover, when we adopt the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) approach we continue to find that the results are significant at the 1% level for
both CAPM and Fama-French abnormal returns despite having only four individual-year
coefficients.
The case of Michaels Stores, a retailer of art and related supplies, illustrates how our
trading rule works. Michaels Stores had approximately 15 million outstanding shares in
1994, and in that year granted over 5 million options to its employees with an exercise
price equal to the current stock price of $12.3. By the end of 1997 the stock price had
increased significantly. As the 1994 options would be fully vested in the next year, our
trading rule predicted a large amount of option exercise and significant negative stock
performance for Michaels Stores in 1998. The annual report for 1998 reports an increase
in shares outstanding from 16.5 million to 21.5 million, reflecting the exercise of just
over 5 million employee options. More important, Michaels had a raw stock return of
just under -30% and a CAPM and Fama-French abnormal return of almost –50%. These3
returns are even less than our estimate of option costs for the year, which is just under
20% of market capitalization.
The above example also reminds us why a large-sample test is required. As we confirm
with a restricted sample of actual exercise data, our rule is based on a reasonable but
noisy estimate of future option exercises. More obviously, stock returns are affected by
factors other than such exercises. For example, Michaels’ annual report ascribed their
negative performance to the market’s unfairly dim assessment of their acquisition of
Aaron’s stores. The Michaels case also overstates our results. According to our point
estimates of between 3 and 5% abnormal negative performance for every 10% of option
costs, Michaels should have experienced abnormal returns of between 6 and 10%.
Finally, Michaels Stores is one of the smaller firms in our sample and while large firms
such as Pepsi also exhibit significant option cost, our rule identifies a disproportionate
number of small firms. While large firms tended to outperform small firms over our
sample period, all our results hold with either an explicit size control or after removing
the effects of the Fama-French size factor.
There is also some indication that our trading rule becomes less effective over time.
This could be because the market eventually learned how to value option obligations and
indeed, there was a change in option reporting rules (SFAS 128) effective after December
1997. However, as stressed by Core, Guay and Kothari (2000), the option reporting rules
do not account for the Black-Scholes values that we use. Moreover, our abnormal
performance is based only on the difference between the Black-Scholes value and the
intrinsic value used by SFAS 128, even in the years before the rule was effective. Put
more directly, the evidence suggests that the market priced-in the portion of option costs
reflected in diluted earnings as early as 1996. It is only the Black-Scholes value that
appears to have been underestimated. We also check our rule against actual option
exercises for a subset of our sample and find no evidence that our trading rule is less
successful in predicting such exercises in later years.
While our tests control for market, size, and book-market factors it is still possible that
we are picking up some version of some other anomaly. However, the most obvious and
important such anomaly, the price momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993), would tend to strengthen our results. All else equal, the cost of
outstanding employee stock options is higher for firms that have had price increases in
previous years, and our measure of option cost has a significant correlation of over 16%
with stock returns in the preceding year.4
I. The Data and the Trading Rule
A. Estimating the cost of option exercises
Our trading rule is based on stock option information from Standard and Poors’
ExecuComp combined with market data from CRSP. ExecuComp reports key
information about option grants to executives for the S&P 1500 firms starting in 1992.
The database covers at most five executives, but also reports the percentage of total
option grants in a given year represented by a given executive option grant.
3 We assume
that other employees have options with the same exercise price as the executives, which
amounts to assuming that they receive their grants at the same time. For most firms in
our sample this is sufficient. But just under 35% of the firms in our sample made
multiple grants to the CEO and/or to other executives. We assume that employees
receive grants in the same proportion as the CEO, i.e., the CEO’s grant is a scale replica
of the total option grant at his/her firm. Finally, we sometimes obtain conflicting values
for the total number of options granted. The reason is that firms sometimes use options
granted for a subsidiary as the denominator in reporting the percentage of options granted
to the total.
4 We use the maximum implied number of options since we are forming our
trading rule at the level of the entire firm, but our stock selections are quite similar if we
use alternative rules.
Our trading rule also requires information about when employees exercise their options,
and the associated costs to shareholders. It is well-known that employees exercise grants
soon after vesting if the option is “sufficiently” in the money. Huddart and Lang (1996)
and Heath, Huddart and Lang (1999) both document spikes in exercise at the fourth year
of an option when it is at least 10-20% in the money. Our trading rule forms portfolios at
the beginning of each year and can only use information at that time. The simplest
plausible approach would be to assume that options become fully vested during the fourth
year of maturity and will be exercised if they begin the year sufficiently in the money.
However, this cost is essentially the same as the one reflected in diluted earnings under
SFAS 128, and effectively assumes that options not currently at the money have zero
cost. We instead use the Black-Scholes value of options (adapted for continuous
dividends) in their fourth year in order to exploit our current information about the
volatility of the stock as well as the current price level. However, we are assuming that
3 Thanks to Wayne Guay for alerting us to the presence of this data item along with some of its
shortcomings.
4 Thanks to Andy Halula of Standard and Poors for clarifying this issue.5
exercise will take place in the year after we form our portfolios. We therefore use a
maturity of only one year in our Black-Scholes values. Clearly, this is not an internally
consistent way to characterize the value of the options to the employees since the Black-
Scholes model would generally tell the employees to wait more than one year (unless
dividend yields were sufficiently high). But it is a reasonable characterization of the
costs borne by shareholders under the assumption that the employees do not have any
private information about the stock’s future price path.
Our precise formula for computing option cost is as follows. In 1992, we take the
number, n1992 and weighted average exercise price of options granted, X1992, for each firm
and then look forward to the end of calendar 1995. At this point we estimate volatility
for each firm using the previous five years of monthly data. We compute a crude
“intrinsic value” version of dollar option cost as the maximum of zero and the difference
between the stock price at the end of 1995 and the exercise price. This number, scaled by
market capitalization, is effectively 1992’s contribution to diluted earnings per share
computed according to SFAS 128 (see Core, Guay, and Kothari, 2000). Our forecast of
dollar option costs that will be realized in 1996 computes the Black-Scholes value of
options granted in 1992 valued at the end of 1995 and assumes a one-year maturity.
Finally, to isolate that portion of option cost that is not recorded in any earnings
statement, we subtract the intrinsic value from our Black-Scholes value and scale by
market capitalization.
More formally, for each firm we compute:
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where C() is the Black-Scholes-Merton formula adopted for the payment of continuous
dividends, P1995 is the stock price at the end of 1995, d is the dividend yield averaged
over the previous five years, σ is the estimated volatility, and T=1 is the assumed time to
maturity. The next term is the intrinsic option cost at the end of 1995 and MCap1995 is
market capitalization at the end of 1995.
Our procedure is similar for subsequent years; we use options granted in 1993 to form
our portfolios for 1997 and so forth. The difference is that we also track whether options
granted in 1992 did in fact come into the money in 1996. If the maximum stock price in
1996 did not exceed the exercise price of options granted in 1992, we use these options as
well as those granted in 1993 to compute our option cost at the end of 1996 for our
portfolio choices for the year 1997. Formally, at the end of 1996 we save the maximum
stock price during the year, P
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We then compute the 1997 stock option cost as:
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If again the 1992 options do not fall in the money, we retain them for the following year.
We do not exogenously drop any options unless their maturity is exceeded, which is a
rare event in our sample given the 9-year window and the fact that most options have a
10-year maturity.
The above procedure embodies an assumption that options vest in four years and that
employees exercise such options in the first year they are vested and in the money. Both
assumptions are only a rough approximation of reality. Some options are vested in 3
years and many vest 25% per year in each of the first four years. Our portfolio choices
are not overly sensitive to the precise assumptions we make about vesting and exercise; if
for example we use a three rather than a four-year vesting period, the rank correlation
between the resulting measures of option costs is over 70%. Similarly, the rank
correlation between the crude “intrinsic value” measure of option cost and our more
refined measure is approximately 63%. However, it is only the difference between the
Black-Scholes and the intrinsic value estimate that results in abnormal performance7
B. Computing Abnormal Returns
The standard approach for estimating the abnormal performance of a trading rule uses
market and other benchmarks along with the trading rule in a single regression. In our
case, this strategy unduly reduces the amount of usable information. Due to the relative
novelty of the ExecuComp data and the relatively long vesting period for employee stock
options, we can only implement our trading rule for four years. Obviously, however, we
have much richer data on market and other relevant benchmarks. In order to make use of
this data, we estimate each of our firms’ beta and exposure to the Fama-French factors
using the previous five calendar years of monthly data. Thus, for CAPM abnormal
returns in 1996 we estimate a beta for each firm using monthly returns from January 1991
to December 1995 and then define abnormal returns as raw return over 1996 minus the
CRSP 1-year T-bill return plus the estimated beta times the difference between the
realized return on the value-weighted S&P 500 and the T-bill return. The three factor
Fama-French benchmark is implemented in the same fashion.
As an indication of the importance of using the additional data in this fashion, if we
restrict ourselves to the use of contemporary annual benchmark data, our estimated betas
are based on only four observations per firm and are actually negatively correlated with
the contemporaneous betas supplied by CRSP. Our five-year betas by contrast are
correlated with the CRSP betas at over 90%.
C. Descriptive statistics and evaluation of our rule for predicting option exercise
Table 1a summarizes the raw data. The first thing to note is that our sample size is
significantly smaller than might be expected with four years of returns and the 1500 firms
covered by ExecuComp. The main reason is that we must match firms’ option grants
with their stock return data four and more years later. To give some idea of the selection
process, Table 1b summarizes key data for the overall ExecuComp sample. Not
surprisingly, we tend to oversample large firms, and to undersample those firms for
whom employee options are large relative to the total amount of equity capital. It is thus
possible that we understate the extent to which the market misvalued employee option
costs. However, all our results remain after including direct size controls in addition to
the Fama-French size factor.
The option cost values in Table 1a are approximately one-third those reported in Core
and Guay’s (2000) study of employee stock options for a similar sample. The reason is
that Core and Guay (2000) characterize the entire portfolio of options held by employees,8
and thus adds non-vested options. We focus attention on options that are at least four
years old and that have not yet come into the money.
Table 1c uses Proxy statement data kindly provided to us by Stuart Gillan on employee
option exercises for a subset of our firms for the years 1997-99. This allows us to gauge
how closely our trading rule predicts the actual realized costs of such options. We
reproduce some of our own numbers for this restricted sample because as the first row of
the table shows, the requirement for our sample to match Gillan’s tends to emphasize
larger firms. Our estimates of the number of options that are at least four years old and
thus fully exercisable tends to overstate the actual amount of exercise, although the
difference is not statistically significant. The difference becomes somewhat narrower if
we use our Black-Scholes approach and deflate the number of exercisable options by the
hedge ratio.
5 More importantly, the Pearson correlation between the expected and the
actual number of exercises is over 50% and this correlation is understated by the
importance of some outliers; the Spearman rank correlation is 76%. The last two rows of
Table 1c indicate that our Black-Scholes method tends to underestimate the actual costs
of employee exercise. An obvious reason is that the market performed abnormally well
in the time period we study. A less obvious reason is that Proxy Statements report the
weighted average exercise price of employee options but do not report the price received
by the employee. Our estimates in Table 1c use the maximum stock price for the year,
which assumes that employees have perfect timing abilities in the year that they exercise.
The values fall by about 15% if we use the average price for the year. Whatever price we
use, the rank correlation between the realized cost and our predicted cost is 73% in 1997,
77% in 1998, and 80% in 1999. While the increase in predictive ability is not significant,
it could reflect the fact that our information about outstanding employee options
improves over time. The reason is that our grant data begins in 1992, so our 1997 trading
rule can only use options granted in 1993 and those granted in 1992 that did not come
into the money in 1996. Actual option exercises in 1997 doubtless included some options
granted before 1992 which we are unable to observe. As time goes forward, such
unobserved options must become less important relative to the ones we can observe.
5 Deflating by the hedge ratio reduces the average size of estimated option exercises by less than 10%. The
large increase in stock prices over our sample period placed most options well in the money so many hedge
ratios are near one.9
II. Performance of the Trading Rule
A. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides some preliminary information on our trading rule’s performance. We
report summary statistics for the firms with the highest expected option cost (decile 1),
for a middle decile 5, and for the firms with the least expected option cost (decile 10).
The data are not inconsistent with our trading rule identifying underperformers. We can
focus on the performance of decile one relative to the others because option cost is small
once we leave the highest decile. The firm at the top of the second decile had an
expected option cost less than 2.7% of its market capitalization and the cost is less than
0.75% by the time we enter the fifth decile. Both measures of abnormal returns (CAPM
and Fama-French) are lower for the highest option cost decile and there is also a tendency
for the raw returns to be somewhat lower. This conclusion holds more strongly when we
look at medians rather than means, implying that the lower performance is not driven by
outliers. The standard errors within deciles preclude any immediate conclusions about
statistical significance and we take up this question in detail in the next subsection.
The remaining data in Table 2 indicate how important it is to control for market and the
Fama-French factors. The high option-cost firms tend to have high volatility, high betas,
and tend to show positive exposure to the Fama-French small-firm factor. These features
are to be expected given the construction of the option cost variable. First, high volatility
will tend to increase the Black-Scholes value relative to intrinsic value. Second, stock
options tend to reflect a larger portion of the equity of smaller firms. Finally, option
exercise prices are fixed rather than indexed to a CAPM benchmark. A firm with a high
beta can significantly underperform its CAPM benchmark but still experience positive
raw returns which in turn makes their employees’ options relatively valuable. This is
another case of the criticism that stock options allow employees to gain even when their
firm is underperforming (e.g., Rappaport, 1999).
B. Tests of statistical and economic significance
Table 3 presents some straightforward regressions to assess the performance of our
trading rule. We pool together the data from our 4 years and include year dummies and
estimate robust standard errors allowing for both heteroskedasticity and the possibility
that errors are correlated across time for each firm. The results tend to support the
performance of our trading rule in that the option cost variable is associated with negative
abnormal returns at the 1% level. Moreover, the effect is of appreciable magnitude. A
firm with 10% of its value reflected in exercisable options tends to underperform in10
subsequent years by between 3 and 5%. If the market truly ignored option costs as we
assume they do, and we had a perfect ex ante measure of these costs, the effect would be
one-to-one. A smaller effect is to be expected given the inevitable errors in forecasting
option exercises (evaluated earlier) and in identifying the portion of the cost that is not
anticipated by the market.
While the results are strong, their statistical significance is in doubt. All variables in the
regressions are highly significant yet the explanatory power is low. While this is a
standard finding in explaining stock returns, it raises the prospect that the standard errors
are understated. However, our reported standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity and
correlated errors. The last two columns of Table 3 estimate median regressions to reduce
the effect of outliers. The CAPM results are stronger while the Fama-French results are
weaker but still significant at the 5% level.
To more directly address the possibility that we have overstated our degrees of freedom
or underestimated the standard errors, Table 4 presents tests following Fama and McBeth
(1973) using OLS estimated coefficients from each of our years. Despite having only
four observations and three degrees of freedom, we are able to strongly reject the
hypothesis that option cost has no effect on either the CAPM or Fama-French abnormal
returns. The coefficients on raw returns are more variable and we are unable to reject the
hypothesis that their mean is zero. The standard errors used in Table 4 are computed
directly by taking the square root of summed squared deviations from the mean. We
obtain smaller estimates and greater statistical significance if we augment the data by
using the mean of 1000 individual bootstrapped standard error estimates with 50
replications apiece.
C. Additional results
The coefficients in Table 4 show some tendency to decline in successive years, although
the effect is by no means statistically significant or consistent across all measures of
abnormal returns. It is nonetheless worth further investigation as it is suggestive of the
market learning how to price option liabilities, albeit slowly. Two alternative
explanations are (a) that the change in option reporting rules alerted the market to the cost
of such options, and (b) that firms continued to underperform when options were
exercised but our rule became less successful at predicting option exercises over time.
Explanation (a) is undercut by the fact that our rule always subtracts out “intrinsic”
option values based on the difference between the prevailing price and the exercise price
at the end of the year before we form our portfolios. This is essentially the same11
information reflected in diluted earnings per share under SFAS 128 and these costs never
predict underperformance even in the years 1996-7 before the rule was in effect.
Explanation (b) is invalidated by the fact that our option data begins in 1992 and we
effectively have a fuller picture of outstanding options as time progresses. Moreover,
based on the actual exercise data provided to us by Stuart Gillan, we are if anything
slightly more successful at identifying exercises in later years. Specifically, the rank
correlation between actual and predicted option exercises is 65% in 1996, 74% in 1997,
77% in 1998 and 82% in 1999.
While our results do not seem to be driven by outliers, there is useful information to be
gleaned by inspecting the most influential observations. Only six of the 100 most
influential observations for either the CAPM or the Fama-French OLS coefficients are
from the same firm in adjacent years.
6 This means that our results are not driven by the
systematic underperformance of some heavy option-using firms. As mentioned above,
this outcome is possible because some firms face significant option costs in multiple
adjacent years. There are many reasons for this pattern. First, some firms are heavy
option granters in each of the years 1992-95. Second, heavy option granters tend to have
high betas and thus expected returns while granting options with exercise prices that are
f i x e di nd o l l a rt e r m s .
7 A useful way to summarize this effect is that our trading rule
performs even better if we impose the additional requirement that no firm can have more
than the mean level of unexpected option cost in adjacent years. A common-sense
argument would be that the market becomes aware of option costs after it is “bitten” once
by a large amount of employee option exercises. While it is doubtless possible to locate a
result in the experimental psychology literature that would justify such a procedure, the
fact is that we only conceived the idea after a thorough analysis of our data.
III. Conclusions and Extensions
A more sophisticated and detailed inspection of employee options could potentially yield
better results. For example, our technique successfully identified Regeneron
Pharamceuticals as a “loser” stock in 1997. Their outstanding shares grew from who
15.3 to almost 19 million during that year in 1996-97 along with a large negative
6 Influential observations are identified using the DFBETAS statistic which computes the effect of a given
on the t-statistic of a chosen variable. No one observation is sufficiently important to drive the significance
below 1% if it were deleted.
7 Not surprisingly, decile firms also have a lower dividend yield than the rest of the sample. This implies
that price increases will also tend to be larger, again boosting option values although the effect is not
significant.12
abnormal return. Our method significantly underestimated the costs of their option
exercises because we used an exercise price of $13. In fact, nearly two million options
issued in 1993 had been repriced in 1994 with the exercise price lowered to $4.
Accounting for repricing and reload features of options would result in a more accurate
assessment of realized option costs. Whether it would also idenfity abnormal returns is
an open question.
Distress factors may also play a role. Our method of isolating firms with large
unexpected option cost also identifies at least two firms that subsequently suffer financial
distress; Gibson Greeting cards in 1998 and Finova in 1999. While the theoretical
rationale for including financial leverage beyond its effect on beta is tenuous, it could at
least increase our understanding of why and how our trading rule actually works.13
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics for the Full Sample of 3094 Observations,
1996-99
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
Shares Outstanding (mill) 138 52.9 271 3.59 3272
Number of 4-year old options/Shares
Outstanding (%)
3.42 1.07 15.9 0 322
Market Capitalization ($ billion) 7.19 1.61 19.8 0.0640 343
“Intrinsic” value of 4-year old
options/Market Capitalization (%)
0.581 0.045 5.26 0 90.5
Unreported Option Cost/Market
Capitalization (%)
1.81 0.434 4.54 0 80.9
Raw Annual Return (%) 18.3 10.5 70.1 -93.0 457
Volatility (% Standard Deviation of
returns)
32.9 29.3 14.5 8.33 177
Beta
+ 1.06 0.987 0.533 -1.32 4.05
Abnormal Return (%) -0.813 -1.33 66.2 -109 258
+ Regression coefficient of previous 60 months raw return on the value-weighted S&P 500 index return.15
Table 1b: Summary Statistics for Execu-Comp Firms with at least two years
of coverage, 1992-97. Observations=8532
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
Number of options/Shares Outstanding
(%)
5.75 0.476 83.3 0 568
Market Capitalization ($ billion) 4.51 1.19 14.2 0.020 343
Raw Annual Return (%) 19.7 13.2 100.4 -97.2 715
Beta
+ 1.10 1.057 0.577 -1.96 5.50
Table 1c: Summary Statistics for 927 firms with complete option and return
data plus data on actual exercises, 1997-99. Observations=927
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max
Market capitalization 11.3 4.88 21.1 0.640 230
Number of options exercised/shares
outstanding
1.62 1.01 2.71 0 87.5
Number of four-year old options/shares
outstanding




1.81 0.860 5.24 0 65.6
Predicted option cost/market
capitalization
1.11 0.292 3.47 0 36.6
+ Regression coefficient of previous 60 months raw return on the value-weighted S&P 500 index return.
++ Estimated as maximum price during the year minus weighted average exercise price times number of
options exercised.16
Table 2: Summary Statistics by Decile of Option Cost/Market
Capitalization




12.1 8.14 10.2 2.71 80.9
Beta 1.35 1.29 0.699 -0.362 3.90
Market Cap 2.24 0.504 6.63 0.0505 66.3
Volatility 48.9 47.2 20.0 16.0 177
Raw Return 16.3 2.54 72.9 -90.3 373
CAPM Ab.
Ret.
-16.7 -28.4 69.4 -165 335
SMB loading 1.12 0.961 1.32 -1.09 12.0
HML loading -0.236 -0.144 0.452 -4.02 9.69




0.523 0.525 0.122 0.270 0.748
Beta 1.04 0.967 0.500 -0.164 2.92
Market Cap 4.96 1.78 11.2 0.060 133
Volatility 29.7 27.3 9.63 14.6 69.1
Raw Return 17.2 10.9 40.9 -78.5 232
CAPM Ab.
Ret.
-5.89 -4.53 40.1 -95.3 230
SMB loading 0.365 0.395 0.649 -1.50 2.93
HML loading 0.181 0.192 0.704 -1.98 2.83




0.0141 0.0111 0.013 0 0.0435
Beta 0.882 0.850 0.436 -0.340 1.98
Market Cap 9.68 2.99 21.2 0.0248 178
Volatility 26.3 23.9 12.7 8.33 83.8
Raw Return 22.1 9.62 65.9 -86.8 387
CAPM Ab.
Ret.
0.489 -1.43 64.1 -115 368
SMB loading 0.319 0.108 0.793 -1.41 3.10
HML loading 0.227 0.266 0.663 -2.29 1.79
FF Ab. Ret. -4.28 -0.332 35.8 -92.1 16217
Table 3: Estimates of returns for pooled sample. 3094 observations, 1996-
99
Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors for the OLS regressions are Huber-
White sandwich errors allowing for correlation within firms using the Stata cluster














































































0.083 0.051 0.058 0.042 0.047
F 26.1 13.5 11.9
* (**) [***] indicates different from zero at 1% (5%), and [10%], respectively18
Table 4: Estimates of the effect of Option Cost/Market Capitalization for
each year, 1996-99
Standard errors in parentheses are Huber-White sandwich errors for annual coefficient
estimates.









































* (**) [***] indicates that individual estimated coefficient is different from zero at 1%
(5%), and [10%], respectively